Why does Finland hesitate to recognise Palestine?

Finland has so far declined to recognise a Palestinian state, despite similar moves by several European countries. Coalition politics, defence priorities, and alignment with key Western partners all influence the country’s stance, experts explain.

Rallies in support of Palestine have been held in several Finnish cities since October 2023. ILLUSTRATIVE PHOTO: ADOBE STOCK.

Ali Belhaj

Published 08.04.2026 at 11:18

Updated 08.04.2026 at 1:30

Prime Minister Petteri Orpo’s government justified its decision not to follow the steps of Norway and France – along with Sweden and Iceland earlier – in recognising an independent Palestinian state by stating that the necessary conditions must first be in place before such a step is taken. 

Helsinki’s reluctance to recognise a Palestinian state so far can be explained by a range of different factors and considerations. 

Ideological and security factors 

“Both the Finns Party and the Christian Democrats opposed this proposal,” says Olli Ruohomäki, a visiting senior fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 

“The prime minister’s party, the National Coalition Party, needed to maintain the cohesion of the coalition government. It seems they were unwilling to risk the unity of the government over this issue.”  

​​Ruohomäki also points to the regional context and the security calculations Finnish decision-makers are considering. Unlike countries that quickly moved toward recognition, such as Ireland and Spain, Finland faces unique security challenges as it shares NATO’s longest land border with Russia. This makes preserving defence cooperation with Israel a key factor in shaping foreign policy decisions. 

He is referring, for example, to Finland’s 2023 purchase of the Israeli David’s Sling air defence system for €317 million. Defence Minister Antti Häkkänen stated in 2025 that cancelling the deal would set the country’s air defence preparations back to square one and delay acquiring similar and necessary capabilities by several years. 

On the other hand, Bruno Jäntti, a doctoral researcher focusing on democracy, human rights and the rule of law in EU foreign policy at the University of Helsinki, argues that although ideological hardliners exist within the Finnish government, their influence remains “marginal.” 

“They will follow the rules if the National Coalition Party instructs them to,” Jäntti says in an email interview. “The decision lies with the party, not a small group of Christian Zionists.” 

“Despite having other options, Finland has signed big contracts with American and Israeli arms manufacturers,” Jäntti highlights. “As a result of these choices, Finland has made itself both unable and unwilling to make any meaningful contribution.” 

He adds that refusing to recognise Palestine – as a symbolic gesture – and not pushing for sanctions against Israel are policies aimed at cherishing Finland’s standing in the eyes of the U.S. and Israeli governments. 

Policy based on consensus and unoriginality 

Ruohomäki also attributes the decision to Finland’s traditional reluctance to take the lead on major political decisions and its preference for reaching the broadest possible consensus within the European Union before taking such steps. 

Finnish foreign policy, he notes, has historically tended to follow the positions of major European powers – particularly Germany, which has also not recognised Palestine. 

Within the Nordic-Baltic context, Ruohomäki points out that Iceland, Sweden and Norway have in recent years shown greater willingness to support the Palestinian cause, while the three Baltic states are among Israel’s strongest supporters, partly due to historical reasons linked to the fate of Jewish communities there during the Second World War. 

“Finland and Denmark have followed – and continue to follow – a middle way between these two regional approaches,” he says. 

Ruohomäki also suggests that policymakers may believe recognising Palestine could hinder Helsinki’s potential role as a mediator between the two sides in the future, similar to Norway’s role in the Oslo Accords during the 1990s. However, he acknowledges that such a role is unlikely given that the United States remains the primary mediator in the conflict. 

Jäntti, meanwhile, argues that Finland has pursued an unoriginal foreign policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the establishment of Israel in 1948. 

“In practice, this policy, unfortunately, means support for Israel’s gradual displacement of Palestinian society, ultimately tolerating the ongoing genocide and the continued material destruction of Palestinians and their society,” he says. 

“Many people take pride in a made-up narrative about Finland promoting democracy and human rights in its foreign policy,” Jäntti adds. 

“In reality, it is more defined by a ‘Team Finland’ approach. We take pride in pointing the finger at official enemies or countries we do not partner with for their human rights records or authoritarian regimes, while maintaining close relations with Israel and others.” 

He notes: “We talk a lot about defending principles or a “rules-based order” – which never really existed – when doing so costs us nothing.” 

“But when we see it as beneficial to align with states that have committed or been complicit in the gravest crimes under international criminal law, we do so without hesitation.”  

Future and what Finns want 

As for whether Finland’s position might change in the future, Ruohomäki notes that when the Social Democrats were previously in power, they did not advance recognition either. At the same time, he acknowledges that the stances of Green and Left Alliance parties following the events of October 7, 2023 in Gaza could indicate that they might take a different position if they return to government. 

However, he cautions that there is often a gap between positions parties take while in opposition and their implementation once in power –a phenomenon he describes as the “burden of governance.” While some parties may support recognising a Palestinian state, governing responsibilities may force them to consider a broader range of national interests and adopt a more cautious approach. 

As for Jäntti, he believes that a change of approach is possible after the next parliamentary election in 2027. 

“One should keep in mind that our current foreign policy toward Israel–Palestine doesn’t align with the political preferences of the Finnish citizenry,” the doctoral researcher notes. 

He points, in this context, to a recent poll by the market research company (Taloustutkimus), which found that 52 percent of Finns support ending arms trade between Finland and Israel until Israel ends its occupation of Palestinian territories, while only 35 percent oppose such a move.